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IMMIGRATION LAW-CONVICTED AS A KID,
DEPORTED AS AN ADULT: CONVICTION UNDER
STATE YOUTH OFFENDER ACT PREDICATES
ASPIRING AMERICAN'S DEPORTATION- COLE

V. U.S. ATT'Y GEN., 712 F.3D 517 (11TH CIR. 2013).
Federal immigration law negotiates a fine line between imposing
civil and criminal penalties on aliens and permanent residents for certain
predicate criminal offenses, including crimes involving moral turpitude
("CIMT") and aggravated felonies.' The INA does not allow explanations
of innocence by aliens or permanent residents who are convicted of either
CIMTs or aggravated felonies.2

In Cole v U.S. Att'y Gen.,' the United

I See Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") § 316, 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (2006) (listing conditions allowing Attorney General to take custody of alien). However, the term moral turpitude has
never been legislatively defined. See Pooja R. Dadhania, Note, The Categorical Approach for
Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude After Silva-Trevino, I I COLUM. L. REV. 313, 315 (2011).
The Supreme Court held that the term was not unconstitutionally vague in Jordan v. De George.
341 U.S. 223 (1951). Pursuant to the DeGeorge decision, courts have defined moral turpitude as
involving conduct that is base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the private and social duties man
owes to his fellow men or to society in general. See id. at 234. Among the consequences of
criminal conduct is the inability of a lawful permanent resident to show the "good moral character" required to go through the naturalization process and become a United States citizen. Aliens
and Nationality, 8 C.F.R. § 316.2(a)(7) (2011) (describing good moral character as someone who
"has been and continues to be a person of good moral character"). "Moral turpitude" is not defined in the INA, and jurisdictions and agencies interpret its meaning differently. See Dadhania,
supra, at 315. A conviction for an "aggravated felony" according to the expanded definition, presents a lifetime ban to showing "good moral character." See Adriane Meneses, Comment, The
Deportation of Lawful Permanent Residents for Old and Minor Crimes: Restoring Judicial Review, Ending Retroactivity, and Recognizing Deportation as Punishment, 14 SCHOLAR 767, 796
(2012). Crimes involving moral turpitude ("CIMT") include theft and robbery, crimes involving
bodily harm, sex offenses, and acts involving recklessness or malice. See id. at 800. Assault with
a deadly weapon is a crime involving moral turpitude because it requires intent to do great bodily
harm. See generally Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571, 573 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating "moral turpitude
is a nebulous concept and there is ample room for differing definitions of the term").
2 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2012). The statute defines a conviction as
[A] formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guild
has been withheld, where-(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has
entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a
finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered some form of the punishment, penalty,
or restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed.
Id. If an alien or permanent resident is convicted of an aggravated felony, he will be removable.
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012). A noncitizen convicted of a CIMT that was committed
within five years after the date of admission is deportable if the crime is one for which a sentence
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States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered whether an alien's conviction for pointing a firearm at another individual was a "conviction" for immigration purposes, and if so, if it constituted an aggravated
felony. 4 The court reasoned that, despite the existence of a circuit split regarding the analysis of the statutory provisions, the language of the statute
was unambiguous, and therefore held that an alien's aggravated felony
conviction in state court renders him ineligible for the withholding of removal .'

Petitioner Chadrick Cole ("Cole") is a native and citizen of Jamaica who was admitted into the United States as a lawful permanent resident
in 2006.6 On April 6, 2009, Cole violated a South Carolina criminal statute, S.C. § 16-23-4 10, which criminalizes pointing a firearm at another person.7 Cole pleaded guilty, and was sentenced under the South Carolina
Youthful Offender Act ("SCYOA") to an indeterminate term of imprison-

of one year or longer may be imposed. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). Even if a noncitizen is actually sentenced to less than one year, he is still deportable or removal under this provision. See
generally Valerie Neal, Note, Slings and Arrows of Outrageous Fortune: The Deportation of
"Aggravated Felons," 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1619, 1630-31 (2003) (discussing issues
caused by Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA")). Ms.
Neal recommends "that Congress address the problems created by ...IIRIRA in some manner..
because in its present form it leads to some fundamentally unfair and absurd results." Id. at
1653.
3 712 F.3d 517, 526-27 (11 th Cir. 2013) (holding "conviction" under South Carolina
law is
conviction for removability purposes).
4 See id. at 524. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), aliens are subject to deportation or removal based on the commission of an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)
(2008). An "aggravated felony" is defined under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) to include crimes of
violence, which are defined at 18 U.S.C.A. § 16 as "an offense that has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person... [and] "any other offense
that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the
person may be used in the course of committing the offense." ld.;
see 18 U.S.C.A. §16 (West
2014); see also Sareang Ye v. INS., 214 F.3d 1128, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding vehicle burglary was not aggravated felony as it lacked substantial risk of physical force).
5 See Cole, 712 F.3d at 532. (finding Cole "automatically deemed to have committed a particularly serious crime"); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012) (listing grounds of inadmissibility);
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4) (stating grounds for deportability); Meneses, supra note 1, at 773-74
("Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) reportedly exercises prosecutorial discretion in
selecting the aliens against whom it seeks to initiate removal proceedings; but when ICE does
pursue prosecution, immigration judges are frequently unable to exercise any form of judicial
discretion, having been stripped in large part of this ability through changes to legislation over the
past twenty years.").
6 See Cole, 712 F.3d at 520 (discussing background of case). Section 101(a)(20) provides:
"The term 'lawfully admitted for permanent residence' means the status of having been lawfully
accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance
with the immigration laws, such status not having changed." 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(20).
7 See Cole, 712 F.3d at 520. (showing S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-23-410 (1976) classifies pointing or presenting loaded or unloaded firearm as felony).
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ment not to exceed five years. 8 The Department of Homeland Security
("DHS") sought to remove Cole for having been convicted of an aggravated felony, specifically a crime of violence for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year.9
Cole submitted an application for asylum, withholding of removal,
and relief under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT").' The Immigration Judge ("IJ") issued a written decision denying all three of Cole's
claims and ordered him removed to Jamaica." Cole appealed the IJ's deci8 Id. at 521. (detailing relevant facts of Cole's conviction). In his brief to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Cole argued, "indeterminate sentences imposed under
the provisions of the youthful offender process cannot be deemed to be the same as indeterminate
sentences imposed for adult criminal offenders." Id. at 531. SCYOA pertains to youthful offenders who are between 17-25 years old at the time of conviction and the conviction is a nonviolent
misdemeanor, a Class E or F felony, or a felony with a maximum imprisonment of 15 years or
less. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-19-10(d)(i)-(ii) (2013). A conviction is defined as a judgment or
plea for a charge with a maximum imprisonment of at least one year and does not allow for punishment by death or life imprisonment. See § 24-19-10(f). Cole was twenty-one years old when
he was convicted of pointing a firearm at another person. See Cole, 712 F.3d at 520-21 (indicating Cole committed offense on April 6,2009). Under South Carolina law, pointing a firearm at
another person is a Class F felony. Compare § 16-1-20 (setting forth punishment for Class F Felony as not more than five years imprisonment), with § 16-23-410. (providing punishment of not
more than five years imprisonment). He pled guilty to the offense under the SCYOA because at
the time of the commission, he was over seventeen but under twenty-five years old and had
committed a Class F felony. See Cole, 712 F.3d at 520-21 (stating Cole pled guilty under
SCYOA): § 24-19-10(d)(i) ("youthful offender means an offender who is under seventeen years
of age and has been bound over for proper criminal proceedings to the court of general sessions
...for allegedly committing an offense ...
that is a misdemeanor ...
or Class F felony.") (internal
quotation marks omitted). Although it is unclear whether or not the SCYOA functions as a juvenile delinquency status, if it does in fact act as a juvenile delinquency status, the arguments promulgated by Cole should have focused on precedent establishing that juvenile delinquency status
convictions are not convictions for immigration purposes. See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration
Crisis:Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM.U. L. REV. 367,403-04 (2006) (arguing
criminal penology favored indeterminate sentences between 1950-1970 for criminal sentence reduction); see also Cassandra S. Shaffer, Comment, Inequality Within the United States Sentencing Guidelines: The Use of Sentences Given to Juveniles by Adult Criminal Court as Predicate
Offenses for the CareerOffender Provision, 8 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 163, 163 (2002) (explaining some state courts impose juvenile criminal sentences for adults).
9 See Cole, 712 F.3d at 521. The Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") sought to remove Cole pursuant to two sections of the INA. Id. Specifically, 8 U.S.C § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii),
for having been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined by 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)(E) and 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C), for having been convicted of a firearms offense. Id. "The DHS later
amended the charge of removability pursuant to § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and alleged, in addition to
the original charges, that Cole also was convicted of an aggravated felony as defined by §
1 101(a)(43)(F), which covers crimes of violence for which the term of imprisonment is at least
one year." Id.
10 See Cole, 712 F.3d at 521. Cole offered three distinct theories in support of his claims: (1)
his developmental disabilities would make him a target for discrimination and persecution; (2) his
status as a deportee would result in government abuse; and (3) his family's involvement with the
People's National Party would make Cole a target for political violence. Id. at 521-22.
11 See id. at 521-22 (summarizing IJ's decision). The IJ reasoned that Cole's conviction was
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sion to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), who dismissed Cole's
appeal, upholding most of the IJ's decisions.12 Cole appealed the BIA's
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
who denied his petition and affirmed the lower court's findings. 3
A criminal conviction in the United States creates a far more serious punishment for aliens than for citizens, as aliens face the possibility of
removal or deportation. 14 In recent years, judges received narrower discretionary authority to prevent removals." Although the scope of judicial discretion has decreased significantly in recent years, the earliest grounds for
restricting immigration on the basis of criminal conduct were based on legislation passed in 1875.16 Congress created legislation to exclude persons
convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude, thereby creating grounds
of removal for conduct committed within the United States, between 1891
and 1917.7
a crime of violence because the offense included an element of "threatened use of physical force
against the person ... of another," and the term of imprisonment exceeded one year, therefore
rendering Cole removable under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Id. at 521-22. Since Cole was convicted of
a felony, the IJ further determined Cole was ineligible for asylum under 8 U.S.C §
I 158(b)(2)(A)(ii), "which bars aggravated felons from obtaining asylum." Id. at 522. Finally, the
IJ found Cole ineligible for withhold because he was convicted of a "particularly serious crime,"
i.e. an aggravated felony that carries a term of imprisonment of five years or more. Id.
12 See id. BIA held that Cole's SCYOA conviction was a conviction for immigration purposes, therefore he was subject to removal having been convicted of an aggravated felony and
crime of violence. Id.
13 See Cole, 712 F.3d at 523. This court reviews "'only the BIA's decision,' except to the
extent that it 'expressly adopt[s] the IJ's opinion or reasoning."' Id. This court further explains
that it "defer[s] to the BIA's permissible construction of ambiguous terms in the Immigration and
Nationality Act" and determines the standard of review under the substantial evidence test. Id.
The court will affirm if the BIA's decision "is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative
evidence on the record considered as a whole." Id.
14 See generally Nelson A. Vargas-Padilla, The Immigration Consequences of Criminal Conduct, 3 AM. CRIM. L. BRIEF 23, 24 (2007) (discussing immigration law consequences of criminal
law violations). Aliens convicted of certain crimes, including aggravated felonies, may be either
deported or deemed inadmissible from the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (providing
grounds of inadmissibility); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (listing grounds for deportability). Removal proceedings are initiated by the DHS, who determine upon which grounds of removal, deportability
or inadmissibility, to charge the alien. See Vargas-Padilla, supra, at 24 (summarizing removal
process).
15 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010) ("While once there was only a narrow
class of deportable offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of deportable offenses and limited
of judges' authority to alleviate the harsh consequences" of deportation....).
16 See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875) (restricting entrance of destitute persons, criminals, and prostitutes).
17 See Immigration Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (revising 1882
Immigration
Act); Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (1917) (revising 1891 Immigration
Act); see also In re Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. 867, 868 (BIA 1994) ("Moral turpitude refers generally to conduct which is inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of
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The immigration reforms of 1990 further reduced immigration
judges' discretionary relief for persons categorized as "aggravated felons."' 8 As grounds for removal have expanded throughout the various
modifications of the INA, the definition of "aggravated felony" has followed suit.' 9 The 1996 provisions of IIRIRA allow an alien incarcerated
within the United States to be removed pursuant to an order issued by DHS
without a hearing before a judge or any additional review.2 0 Despite extensive modification and drafting of the INA, the question of indeterminate
sentencing for purposes of removal and how the BIA should measure such

morality ....
[It is] an act which is per se morally reprehensible or intrinsically wrong ....
");Stacy Caplow, Governors! Seize the Law: A Call to Expand the Use of Pardons to Provide Relief
From Deportation,22 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 293, 306 (2013) (arguing the need for increased use of
executive pardons). The Immigration Act of 1917 included the first mention of a pardon proviso,
which systematically codified defenses to deportation and "empowered both the executive and the
judiciary to thwart deportation." Caplow, supra, at 306-07.
18 See Meneses, supra note 1, at 782-83. In order to mitigate the steep consequences of the
grounds of deportability, Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation ("JRAD") allowed sentencing judges in both state and federal prosecutions to make a binding recommendation 'that
such alien shall not be deported.' Created as part of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917,
JRAD discretionary relief from deportation was severely curtailed when the 1952 INA eliminated
the availability of JRAD relief for narcotics offenses. Nearly forty years later in 1990, JRAD was
eliminated completely, leaving trial judges presiding over criminal cases unable to prevent noncitizen defendants from being placed in removal proceedings.
Id. at 782-83. See Caplow, supra note 17, at 308 (discussing concerned legislators regarding
grounds for deportation based on poorly defined criminal activity).
19 See Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT 90), Pub. L. No. 101-649, 649, § 4978, 104 Stat.
5048 (modifying definition of "aggravated felony" to include analysis of sentence imposed);
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Forced Apart: Families Separatedand Immigrants Harmed by United
States
Deportation
Policy,
34
(July
17,
2007),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0707-web.pdf
[In] the Immigration Law of 1996 ...people were defined as felons in a new way.
They were picked up off the streets in the middle of the night, deported without any
due process - and these were legal people, here legally, but may have committed some
crime, even shoplifting 20 or 30 years ago.
Id. at 34. See INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006) (denoting twenty-one subsections describing offenses considered aggravated felonies). The 1996 codification of aggravated
felonies allowed the definition to expand in scope, as it categorized many state misdemeanors as
aggravated felonies that were grounds for removal. INA §101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (defining "aggravated felony"). See generally In re Marroquin-Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. 705, 705
(BIA 2005) (discussing alien convicted remains convicted notwithstanding state expungement
action); In re Salazar-Regino, 23 I. & N. Dec. 223, 223 (BIA 2002) (discussing crimes defined as
aggravated felonies); In re Roldan-Santoyo, 22 1. & N. Dec. 512, 512 (BIA 1999) (analyzing INA
definition of aggravated felony). The IIRIRA also broadened the definition of "conviction" and
"sentence" to apply to any reference of imprisonment or sentence, regardless of any deferred adjudication, probation, suspension, or expungement. See Siddiqui v. Holder, 670 F.3d 736, 739
(7th Cir. 2012) (discussing effect and application of IIRIRA).
20 See 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (providing for expedited removal of aliens convicted of aggravated
felonies).
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sentences is still heavily debated by a circuit split between the sixth and the
tenth circuits.2'
No court has jurisdiction to review any final order of removal, except for "review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a
petition for review. 22 In Cole v U.S. Att'y Gen., the Eleventh Circuit considered whether Cole's conviction under the SCYOA qualified as a conviction for immigration purposes.23 The court relied on the statutory definition
of "conviction," explaining that the text enumerates two conditions, both of
which an SCYOA conviction satisfies. 24 The court states that any formal
judgment of guilt entered by a court is a conviction. 25 Despite this issue
21

See In re S-S-, 211. & N. Dec. 900,902-03 (BIA 1997) (asserting BIA measures all inde-

terminate sentences by their maximum possible term). In Nguyen v. INS, the Tenth Circuit deferred to the BIA's rule, explaining that it "accords with the Sentencing Guidelines' rationale that
the term '"sentence of imprisonment'.., refers to the maximum sentence imposed."' Nguyen v.
INA, 53 F.3d 310, 311 (10th Cir. 1995). Conversely, the Sixth Circuit's reasoning questions
whether deference to the BIA rule is wise, since Chevron v. NRDC, Inc., deference applies only to
"an agency's construction of the statute which it administers..." Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S.
837, 842 (1984).
22 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2005). The 1 th Circuit determined the extent of their subject
matter jurisdiction de novo, because it always has jurisdiction over legal and constitutional questions. See Cole v. U.S. Gen., 712 F.3d 517,523 (1 1th Cir. 2013) (describing court's subject matter jurisdiction).
23 See Cole, 712 F.3d at 524. The court considered the legislative history of IIRIRA, and
concluded that "Congress intended for an alien's conviction to count as a conviction as soon as
the original judgment or finding of guilt occurred." Id. at 526; see H.R. CONF. REP. 104-828, at
224 (1996) (revising definition of "conviction" and broadening its scope). The definition of
"conviction" was deliberately broadened to ensure that the federal meaning of the term would be
unaffected by the states' "myriad of provisions for ameliorating the effects of a [state] conviction," for immigration purposes. See H.R. CoNF. REP. 104-828, at 224.
24 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing INA definition of conviction). The
court reasons that since the statute "makes no distinction based on the age of the offender or what
type of proceeding results in the conviction," and since "the statute does not carve out any exception for conviction that come with the possibility of expungement in the future," a conviction under SCYOA is a sound conviction. Cole, 712 F.3d 517 at 524. This analysis creates problems
with the SCYOA because § 22-5-920(B) provides the youth offender, who "after five years from
the date of completion of his sentence, including probation and parole, may apply ... to the circuit court for an order expunging the records of the arrest and conviction." S.C. CODE ANN.. §
22-5-920(B) (2011). The state law statute is in direct conflict with the interpretation of removability pursuant to the INA by both the Supreme Court of the United States and the South Carolina
Supreme Court. See generally James A. R. Nafziger & Michael Yimesgen, Article, The Effect of
Expungement on Removability of Non-Citizens, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 915, 915-17 (2003)
(discussing effect of state expungment statutes on alien removability).
25 See Cole, 712 F.3d at 524. The Court of General Sessions in South Carolina accepted
Cole's conviction, which is a court of justice with authority over criminal matters. Id. Therefore,
the two prongs of 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(48)(A) are satisfied because Cole "entered a plea of guilty"
and "the judge.. .ordered some form of punishment," and what could happen in the future, such as
the possibility of expungement is irrelevant for immigration purposes. Id. at 524-25; see also In
re Roldan, 22 I. & N. Dec. 512 (BIA 1999) (holding state rehabilitative action such as expungement will receive no effect). In Wellington v. Holder, the Second Circuit debated upholding or
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presenting itself as a matter of first impression, the court relied upon the
reasoning of Resendiz-Alcaraz v. U.S. Att'y Gen. and Singh v. U.S. Att'y
Gen. to argue that 8 U.S.C. § 110 1(a)(48)(A) was unambiguous.26
An aggravated felony carries the most severe immigration consequences for an alien.2 7 Crimes of violence are considered aggravated felonies for immigration purposes, and are defined as any crime for which the
term of imprisonment is at least one year, and that involve at least a substantial likelihood of physical force being used during their commission."

overruling the rule in Matter of Roldan. 623 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 2010) Specifically, the court
reasoned, "Five circuits have agreed with the BIA and held that there is no exception to the definition of 'conviction' under the INA for aliens who receive state rehabilitative relief... All five of
these courts upheld Roldan by applying normal principles of statutory construction, without
granting Chevron deference to the BIA's interpretation of the statute." See Id. at 119-120; see
also Chevron v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding court defers to agency interpretation
when Congressional intent is unclear).
26 See Singh v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 561 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009); Resendiz-Alcaraz v.
U.S. Att'y Gen., 383 F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004). In Resendiz-Alcaraz, the court held that
an expunged conviction qualified as a conviction for immigration purposes. Id. at 1271. The petitioner had been convicted of possession of marijuana in a Missouri state court. See id. at 1265
(detailing relevant facts of Resendiz-Alcaraz's conviction). Although Resendiz-Alcaraz's conviction was expunged a year later, the Eleventh Circuit found that his state conviction satisfied the
conditions of § 1101 (a)(48)(A). See id. at 1271 (finding petitioner removable). In Singh v. U.S.
Att'y Gen., the fifteen-year old petitioner pled guilty to several felonies, prompting the INS to
seek his removal. See Singh, 561 F.3d at 1277-78 (summarizing Singh's convictions for burglary
and grand theft). Id. at 1277. The court rejected petitioner's argument that his juvenile convictions did not meet constitute a "conviction" for immigration purposes. See id. at 1279 ("[A] conviction in adult court is a conviction for immigration purposes, no matter how old the alien was at
the time of the offense."). Instead the court followed the plain reading of §1101(a)(48)(A), and
held Singh's convictions as grounds for removability. See id. (adopting reasoning of the First,
Second, and Ninth Circuits). The Cole court reasoned that "Resendiz-Alcaraz and Singh establish
that, standing alone, neither the possibility of expungement nor the age of the offender are relevant in determining whether a conviction in a criminal court of general jurisdiction qualifies as a
conviction for immigration purposes." Cole, 712 F.3d at 525-26 (asserting definition of "conviction" does not make exceptions but rather applies uniformly to all convictions); see also Dung
Phan v. Holder, 667 F.3d 448,453-54 (4th Cir. 2012) (reasoning set aside of petitioner's conviction had no implication on its use for immigration purposes).
27 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (defining a "conviction" as a formal judgment of
guilt entered by a court). Under current immigration law, an alien convicted of an aggravated
felony at any time after admission is deportable or removable. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)
(2013). Conviction of an aggravated felony results in harsh immigration consequences, among
them ineligibility for release on bond, ineligibility for asylum, and ineligibility for discretionary
cancellation of removal. See also Jason A. Cade, The Plea-BargainCrisis for Noncitizens in
Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REv. 1751, 1758 (2013) (discussing expansion of aggravated felony immigration consequences to minor convictions from state court convictions); See also
David Cheng, Emigres of the Killing Fields: The Deportationof Cambodian Refugees as a Violation of InternationalHuman Rights, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 221, 223-24 (2005) (arguing despite the unfairness of the INA aggravated felony provisions, courts continue to sanction noncitizens).
28 See Crime of Violence Defined, 18 U.S.C. § 16. (West 2014). Crime of violence means:
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The Court discussed how the common law has developed such that crimes
of violence encompass a necessary mens rea element. 29 The Supreme
Court of South Carolina has interpreted S.C. Code § 16-23-410 as having
three distinct elements: (1) pointing or presenting; (2) a loaded or unloaded
firearm; (3) at another. ° Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Leocal,

(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a
felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the
person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.
Id. The court employs a categorical approach to determine whether Cole's state law offense qualifies as a crime of violence for immigration purposes. See Cole, 712 F.3d at 527. A categorical
approach means, "look[ing] to the elements and the nature of the offense of conviction, rather
than to the particular facts relating to petitioner's crime." Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 7
(2004). This approach was first introduced in Taylor v. United States. See 495 U.S. 575, 601-02
(1990). The Supreme Court instructed lower courts to look "only to the fact of conviction and the
statutory definition of the prior offense." Id. at 602. This analysis was to avoid the "practical
difficulties and potential unfairness" of a lengthy and detailed factual review of the offense. Id. at
601. But see Descaps v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 2280-81 (2013) ("Because generic unlawful entry is not an element, or an alternative element... a conviction under that statute is never for
generic burglary. Descamps' ACCA enhancement was therefore improper"). As a federal court
analyzes a state law offense, the federal court is bound by the state supreme court's interpretation
of state law, "including its determination of the elements of [a crime]." See Johnson v. United
States, 559 U.S. 133, 138 (2010). In instances when the state Supreme Court has not definitely
ruled, the court is bound by "decisions of a state's intermediate appellate courts unless there is
persuasive evidence that the highest state court would rule otherwise." Pendergast v. Sprint
Nextel Corp., 592 F.3d 1119, 1133 (11 th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. King, 673 F.3d
274, 279-80 (4th Cir. 2012) (analyzing S.C. Code § 16-23-410 for sentencing purposes).
29 See Leocal, 543 U.S. at 3-4 (finding DUI conviction contained no mens rea element and
therefore was not crime of violence). The lower court in Leocal determined that a Florida statute
criminalizing driving under the influence of alcohol and causing serious bodily injury was a crime
of violence under 8 U.S.C. § 16. See id. at 3-4 (summarizing procedural history). The Supreme
Court began by analyzing the language of the Florida statute, and emphasized, "the critical aspect
of §16(a) is that a crime of violence is one involving the use of physical force against the person
or property of another." See id. at 9. The Supreme Court took the analysis one step further, suggesting "use.. against.. .another.. requires active employment ... [and] ...naturally suggests a
higher degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental conduct." Id. at 9. Thus, the Court
reasoned that since the Florida statute failed to incorporate an element of mens rea, it could not be
a crime of violence under §16(a). See id. at 10.
30 See State v. Burton, 589 S.E. 2d 6, 8 (S.C. 2003) (discussing interpretation of state statute).
When considering the three distinct elements of S.C. Code § 16-23-410, it seems to fail the
Leocal mens rea requirement. Id. However, South Carolina's Court of Appeals subsequently
held that the term "presenting" means "showing or displaying a firearm in a threatening or menacing manner" and thus requires an intentional mens rea. See In Re Spencer, 692 S.E. 2d 569,
573 n.2 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010) ("the state must offer direct or circumstantial evidence that a person
specifically intended to present a firearm at someone before a conviction may be sustained .... ").
The court in Cole is "bound by the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the offense." 712 F.3d at
528. "There is a substantial risk that the act of pointing a firearm at another will provoke the sort
of confrontation that leads to the intentional use of physical force." Id. See generally James v.
United States, 550 U.S. 192, 203 (2007) ("The main risk of burglary arises not from the simple
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the Fourth Circuit previously held that S.C. Code § 16-23-410 constituted a
crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and the Cole court found the
Fourth Circuit persuasive on the matter.3' It held that Cole's offense of
pointing a firearm at another was a crime of violence, making Cole an aggravated felon for immigration purposes.32
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
reached its decision by following strict case precedent and traditional statutory interpretation. 3 ' The court followed the precedent established by the
First, Second, and Ninth Circuits in deciding that a "conviction" pursuant
to a youth offender state statute fulfills the requirements enumerated by 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A).34 It reasoned that the text of the INA compelled
it to treat any formal judgment of guilt entered by a court as a conviction.35
The specific language of 8 U.S.C. § 10 1(a)(48)(A) fails to distinguish the
definition of conviction based on the age of the offender or the type of proceeding resulting in a conviction.36 The major problem with the Court's

physical act of wrongfully entering onto another's property, but rather from the possibility of a
face-to-face confrontation between the burglar and a third party....").
31 See United States v. Thompson, 891 F.2d 507, 509 (4th Cir. 1989) ("In each of the reported South Carolina cases, the pointing of a firearm at another person was accompanied by the use
of physical force."). The Cole court concluded that "the substantial risk that accompanies a violation of S.C. Code § 16-23-410 springs not from general recklessness but from the fact that 'by its
nature,' it 'involves a substantial risk' that the perpetrator 'will use force against a victim."' Cole,
712 F.3d at 528-529.
32 See Cole, 712 F.3d at 529. The court was not persuaded by Cole's attempt to distinguish
"pointing" from "presenting" and disagreed with his argument that only "presenting" had the intentional mens rea of threatening another. See id. (citing States v. King, 673 F.3d 274, 280, n. 4
(4th Cir. 2012)) ("[Tlhe two disjunctively worded terms stand on equal footing by both requiring
threatening behavior"). The court acknowledged the serious consequences of its determinations
for Cole, namely that "pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and the definition of aggravated
felony in § 1 101(a)(43)(F)," Cole was removable as an alien. Id.
33 See Cole, 712 F.3d at 517 (discussing the issue of first impression before the court). The
major issues before the court were: (1) whether an alien's state conviction for pointing a firearm
at another person was a conviction within the meaning of the INA; and (2) if the alien's state
conviction constituted an aggravated felony. Id.
34 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing conviction under youthful offender
statute is conviction for immigration purposes). Courts have grappled with the dramatic consequences of deportation for decades, yet they have yet to achieve a fair balance for removing aliens
convicted pursuant to youth offender statutes. See generally Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (Brewer, J. dissenting) (arguing deportation is a most severe and cruel punishment).
35 See Cole, 712 F.3d at 524. (reasoning statute does not make distinctions based on offender's age or type of proceeding). But see In re Devison-Charles, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1362, 1373 (BIA
2000) (holding resentencing following violation of probation does not convert youthful offender
judgment into conviction).
36 See Cole, 712 F.3d at 524. Although problematic, the court's reasoning in deciding that
Cole's SCYOA conviction satisfies the INA definition of conviction is a matter of strict interpretation. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) enumerates two conditions, both which are met by SCYOA. 8
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reasoning is an unwillingness to withhold Cole's removal because a
SCYOA conviction has a possibility of expungement in the future.37
Since the court found Cole's SCYOA conviction to fit the statutory
definition of "conviction" for immigration purposes, it also concluded that
§16-23-410 was a crime of violence. 8 The court relied on the categorical
approach, looking to the "elements and the nature of the offense of conviction," rather than to the particular facts relating to Cole's crime. 39 Despite

U.S.C. § 110 1(a)(48)(A)(i)(ii) (2013). First, a judge in the court of general sessions found Cole
guilty and second, the judge ordered some form of punishment or penalty. Cole, 712 F.3d at 524.
The Court of General Sessions accepted Cole's guilty plea and sentenced him to serve an indeterminate sentence of up to five years. Id. This act satisfied both conditions of the INA. Id. at
525. But see Phan v. Holder, 667 F.3d 448,452 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (rejecting argument that offender of D.C.'s Youth Rehabilitation Act was adjudicated as juvenile delinquent). Immigration law
has long considered juvenile delinquency adjudications not to be convictions. See In re DevisonCharles, 22 1. & N. Dec. at 1365 ("We have consistently held that juvenile delinquency proceedings are not criminal proceedings, that acts of juvenile delinquency are not crimes, and that findings of juvenile delinquency are not convictions for immigration purposes.").
37 See supra note 2(considering possibility of expungement does not matter for conviction
purposes). See Jason A. Cade, Deporting the Pardoned,46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 355, 355-56
(2012) ("[L]imitations on the preclusive effect of pardons, expungements, appeals, and similar
post-conviction processes undermine sovereign interests in maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system"). § 22-5-920(B) of SCYOA expressly provides the youth offender, who "after
five years from the date of completion of his sentence, including probation and parole, may apply.. to the circuit court for an order expunging the records of the arrest and conviction." See
S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-5-920(B) (2011); see also Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2464-66
(2012) (discussing differences between adult and youth offenders). In Miller, the Court discussed
case precedent establishing the constitutional differences between children and adults for sentencing purposes. Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2464. The Court discussed the three significant differences
between juveniles and adults, including recklessness, impulsivity, vulnerability, and "a child's
character is not as 'well formed' as an adult's." Id. The Miller Court relied on previous decisions, including Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005), in arguing that "the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on
juvenile offenders... [b]ecause... the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an
adult." Id. at 2464 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 571). Additionally, the Supreme Court's decision
in Padilla mandates that defense counsel inform non-citizen alien clients whether a possible criminal plea carries a risk of deportation. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 365 (2010). Although the
court debated whether deportation was a direct or collateral consequence to a guilty plea, the
court nonetheless restated that it is a "particularly severe 'penalty' ." Id. at 365 (quoting Fong Yue
Ting, 149 U.S. at 740).
38 See Cole, 712 F.3d at 526. The court found that the element of intent satisfied Leocal's
intent requirement pursuant to 18 U.S.C.S. § 16(b). Id. at 527-28 (reasoning "presenting means
showing or displaying a firearm in a threatening or menacing manner") (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (asserting crimes of violence have
requisite mens rea element). The court reasoned that the language of 18 U.S.C.S. § 16(b) defines
a "crime of violence" as "any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the
course of committing the offense." Id. at 527.
39 Id. at 527 (quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004)). A crime's violent character is
assessed on the face of the statute under which the defendant was convicted. See Alice Ristroph,
Criminal Law in the Shadow of Violence, 62 ALA. L. REV. 571, 605 (2011). In deciding a crime's
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this court's application of the categorical approach as being the appropriate
method of determining applicability of the grounds of removal, recent case
law has implemented a different standard.40 On issues of state law, such as
which elements are necessary to convict a person of some state-level crime,
the court was bound by the decisions of South Carolina's intermediate appellate courts unless there was persuasive evidence that the highest state
court would rule otherwise in deciding Cole's state law offense.
Following the rule established in Leocal, the court correctly asked
whether Cole's state-law offense contained a mens rea greater than negligent conduct. 42 The analytical logic of the court seems reasonable, howev-

violent characteristics, the courts turn to the statutory definition, considering whether the statute
includes the use or attempted or threatened use of force, or "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." Id.at 604 (quoting James v. United
States, 550 U.S. 192, 197 (2007)). "When the text of a state criminal statute does not clearly fall
within or without the generic federal definition ....courts may consider the actual indictment,
information, or jury instructions from the defendant's trial." Id. at 604, n.165. The first prong of
the definition, i.e. the use, threatened use, or attempted use of force, is consistent with the conceptions of violence as seen in common law and modern definitions of substantive offenses. Id. at
605. However, the second prong, i.e. a serious potential risk of physical injury, is a "substantial
expansion of the concept of violence...." Id. This expanded definition of violence results in the
categorization of offenses that are not crimes against the person. Id.
40 See Meneses, supra note 1, at 793 (discussing analysis including "non-elemental
facts").
The BIA differentiates between (a) grounds of deportability that focus entirely on the actual elements of the conviction, and (b) grounds of deportability that instead include factors "not tied to
the elements of any State or Federal criminal statute." Id. at 793 n. 127 (quoting In re Babaisakov, 24 I&N Dec. 306, 309 (BIA 2007)). Since 2007, an analysis of evidence outside of the
record of conviction is permitted to determine whether "non-elemental" factors have been met for
an alien to qualify as an aggravated felon. Id. Thus far, the "non-elemental" inquiry into facts
outside the record of conviction has not been applied to non-aggravated felony grounds of deportability. In re Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I&N Dec. 503, 516-17 (BIA 2008). The Cole court decided
to use the categorical approach because they did not want to engage in a complicated analysis of
the facts specific to Cole's conviction. Cole, 712 F.3d at 527-528. If the court had engaged in a
non-elemental analysis, perhaps the court would have found that Cole's youth offense was not
enough as a ground of removability. But see Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 200 (5th Cir.
2014) (holding judges may consider only "the inherent nature of the crime, as defined in the statute"). Following the Silva-Trevino decision, courts are required to conduct an element analysis
when considering if a crime in a state court constitute a conviction for immigration purposes. Id.
41 See Cole, 712 F.3d at 527 (quoting Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 592 F.3d 1119,
1133 (1 1th Cir. 2010)) (discussing authority of intermediate courts).
42 See id. The Leocal court reviewed a decision holding that FLA. STAT. § 316.193(3)(c)(2),
which criminalized driving under the influence of alcohol and causing serious bodily injury, was
not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C § 16, specifically because it lacked a mens rea element.
Leocal, 543 U.S. at 3-4. On its face, S.C. Code § 16-23-410 seems to lack the mens rea requirement, because the statute only states, "it is unlawful for a person to present or point at another
person a loaded or unloaded firearm." Cole, 712 F.3d at 528. However, the South Carolina Court
of Appeals clarified the definition of "presenting" to mean "showing or displaying a firearm in a
threatening or menacing manner," which requires an intentional mens rea. Id.; see also In re
Spencer, 387 S.C. 517, 692 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010) ("[T]he State must offer direct or circumstantial
evidence that a person specifically intended to present a firearm at someone before a conviction
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er, the problem is that in an immigration context, once the court determines
that Cole's state conviction is a violent crime, he inevitably becomes an
aggravated felon. 43 Legally, the court correctly affirmed the BIA's determinations, however for policy reasons, this court failed to fully appreciate
the consequences of its decision. 4 The Cole court failed to take initiative
may be sustained."). The Cole court argues that since the South Carolina Supreme Court has upheld this definition of "presenting" in subsequent cases, the court is bound by the interpretation.
Cole, 712 F.3d at 528.
43 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing immigration ramifications
of conviction as aggravated felon). The court dismisses Cole's argument that on its face, S.C. Code § 1623-410 criminalizes pointing even with an unloaded firearm, because the court concludes "being
unloaded does not render a firearm non-threatening." Cole, 712 F.3d at 529; see generally Lupe
S. Salinas, Deportations,Removals and the 1996 Immigration Acts: A Modern Look at the Ex
Post Facto Clause, 22 B.U. INT'L L.J. 245, 248 (2004) (arguing need for aliens to receive due
process protection following expanded definition of aggravated felony).
44 See Cole, 712 F.3d at 529. ("There are three significant consequences to this
determination. First, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and the definition of aggravated felony in
§1 101(a)(43)(F), the BIA correctly determined that Cole was a removable alien..."). As such,
Cole was unable to apply for withholding of removal or asylum because asylum is not available
to aliens convicted of particularly serious crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2009) (reasoning aliens convicted of particularly serious crimes pose danger to United States community);
Cole, 712 F.3d at 529 (recognizing Cole's conviction bars him from seeking asylum). A "particularly serious crime" is synonymous with conviction of an aggravated felony. See Cole, 712 F.3d
at 530. This court failed to consider the policy reasons discussed in Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting) or subsequent cases where courts discuss the realities of deportation. Cf. Javier Bleichmar, Deportationas Punishment: A Historical
Analysis of the British Practice of Banishment and its Impact on Modern ConstitutionalLaw, 14
GEO. !MMIGR. L.J. 115, 115-119 (1999) (arguing deportation is punishment rather than mere civil
remedy); See also Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1890-91 (2000)
(discussing practical effects of deportation). There have been many arguments regarding the
Eighth Amendment violations caused by punishing juveniles like adults. See Diatchenko v. Dist,
Att'y, I N.E.3d 270, 276-278 (Mass. 2013) (discussing inherent differences between juvenile and
adult offenders). The Diatchenko court considered the precedent and reasoning established by the
Miller court, concluding, "[slimply put, because the brain of a juvenile is not fully developed,
either structurally or functionally, by the age of eighteen, a judge cannot find with confidence that
a particular offender, at that point in time, is irretrievably depraved." Diatchenko, 1 N.E. 3d at
284.; see Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012) (recognizing children are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes). The Supreme Court has consistently held that
deportation is a civil, non-punitive punishment, rather than a criminal sanction. See Anita Ortiz
Maddali, Padilla v. Kentucky: A New Chapter in Supreme Court Jurisprudenceon Whether Deportation Constitutes Punishmentfor Lawful Permanent Residents?, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 5-6
(2011) (arguing deportation of convicted aliens constitutes punishment, notwithstanding Supreme
Court's assertions to the contrary). But see Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365-66 (2010)
(recognizing removal proceedings, while civil in nature, are intimately related to criminal process). In Padilla, the Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment's right to effective assistance of
counsel is especially critical for aliens in criminal proceedings, when a guilty verdict could ultimately impact their immigration status. See id. at 373-74 (emphasizing risk of deportation places
heightened importance on Sixth Amendment protections). Despite the progress made for noncitizens due to the Padilladecision, juvenile offenders continue to face the grave consequence of
deportation by violating state laws. See Beth Caldwell, Banishedfor Life: Deportationof Juve-
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from Padilla and instead followed a traditional strict statutory interpretation analysis.45 One of the major components of Cole's case that the court
does not discuss is whether he was adequately informed of the legal ramifications of pleading guilty pursuant to the SCYOA.46
The issue before the Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit was
whether an alien's conviction for pointing a firearm at another individual
was a "conviction" for immigration purposes, and if so, if it constituted an
aggravated felony. The court held that the defendant's conviction satisfied
the requirements of "conviction" for immigration purposes, as a judge of
the Court of General Sessions accepted his guilty plea and sentenced him to
serve an indeterminate sentence of up to five years. Following an established categorical approach, the court held that the defendant's conviction
for pointing a firearm at another individual constituted an aggravated felony because of the incorporated mens rea element. Since the defendant was
a permanent resident who was convicted of an aggravated felony within
five years of receiving his permanent resident status, he was determined
removable or deportable by this court. The Court of Appeals should have
conducted a balancing test to weigh the public policy options of deporting
an individual who was convicted on account of a state youth offender statute with the possibility of expungement.
Shirin Afsous

nile Offenders as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2261, 2264 (2013)
("[D]eportation is a punishment under the law, and the mandatory deportation of those deported
due to a juvenile conviction violates the Eight Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.").
45 See also Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007) (discussing nature of
criminal law within context of immigration law).
46 See id. at 487. This decision follows a line of cases illustrating the lack of arguments
available to defendants facing deportation after being deemed aggravated felons. Id. at 471. It is
unclear from the decision whether Cole raised an argument as to ineffective counsel. See
Maryellen Meymarian. Providing Immigration Advice During Criminal Proceedings: Preempting
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims When Non-Citizen Aliens Seek to Withdraw Guily Pleas
to Avoid Adverse Immigration Consequences, 39 AM. J. CRIM. 53, 55 (2011) (discussing difficulties of providing adequate legal counsel during criminal proceedings). However, failure to provide competent and accurate advice concerning potential deportation consequences constitutes a
Sixth Amendment violation. See id. Although the court in Padilla pointed out that the decision
primarily affected defense counsel, specifically when immigration consequences are "succinct,
clear, and explicit," the court further discussed the burden on prosecutors and judges in such proceedings. Id. at 55 (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368). "Prosecutors and judges must preserve
limited judicial resources and affirmatively seek to prevent future ineffective assistance of counsel claims." Id. There have been so many ineffective counsel claims from defendants that ICE
has prepared a "tool kit for prosecutors" to assist prosecutors in understanding the potential consequences of a criminal conviction in the immigration process. Id. at 56, ICE, Protecting the
Homeland:
Tool
Kit
for
Prosecutors,
(April
2011),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/osltc/pdf/tool-kit-for-prosecutors.pdf.

